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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Dans cet article je considère un récent défi à l’égalitarisme développé par Michael 
Huemer. Le challenge de Huemer prend la forme d’un dilemme : les égalitaristes peuvent 
être soit atomistes soit holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur de l’égalité. S’ils sont 
atomistes, alors ils doivent acceptés que l’égalité n’ait pas de valeur intrinsèque ; s’ils 
sont holistes, alors leur point ce vue est inconsistant avec une intuitive mais très plausible 
forme de conséquentialisme. Je montre que ce dilemme ne doit pas perturber les 
égalitaristes. Ils peuvent être holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur et adhérer en même 
temps au conséqeuntialisme. 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I consider a recent challenge to egalitarianism raised by Michael Huemer. 
Huemer’s challenge takes the form of a dilemma: egalitarians can either be atomists or 
holists about equality’s value. If they are atomists, then they must accept that equality in 
fact does not have intrinsic value; if they are holists, then their view will be inconsistent 
with an intuitively very plausible form of consequentialism. I show that this dilemma 
should not trouble egalitarians. Egalitarians can be holists about value and still embrace 
consequentialism.  
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Equality and Value-holism  
 
 
Egalitarians believe that equality between persons in the distribution of significant goods is 
intrinsically valuable.1 The main and familiar objection to this view has been the so-called 
levelling down objection: if equality is intrinsically valuable, then this would entail, counter-
intuitively, that the world is made better when equality is achieved by bringing better off 
people down to the level of the worst off (all else being equal), even if this does not improve 
the condition of the worst off.2 Whether this objection to egalitarianism is fatal, however, 
remains an open question.3 In this paper, I consider a second and more recent challenge to 
egalitarianism raised by Michael Huemer.4 Although Huemer does not present it in this way, 
his challenge essentially takes the form of a dilemma: egalitarians can either be atomists or 
holists about equality’s value (a distinction I shall explain shortly). If they are atomists, then 
they must accept that equality in fact does not have intrinsic value; if they are holists, then 
their view will be inconsistent with an intuitively very plausible form of consequentialism. 
Either way, so Huemer maintains, we should reject egalitarianism. 
I show that this dilemma should not trouble egalitarians. Egalitarians can be holists about 
value and still embrace consequentialism. As well as showing that egalitarianism can resist 
Huemer’s challenge, the arguments in the paper also give some support to a further 
conclusion about the relationship between egalitarianism and value-theory: egalitarians must 
be value-holists if they wish to hold a coherent position.  
 
1.  
 
I begin with a brief summary of Huemer’s argument. Huemer aims to show that if we accept 
three basic assumptions about the nature of value, we must reject egalitarianism. The three 
assumptions commit us, in other words, to the conclusion that equality between persons is 
not intrinsically valuable. Huemer’s three assumptions are as follows:  
 
Intrapersonal non-egalitarianism: equality in the distribution of utility across times within a 
single individual's life is evaluatively neutral (i.e. how utility is spread across a life is a 
matter of moral indifference).5 
                                            
1 By “intrinsic value”, I mean “non-instrumental value”. 
2 For the canonical statement of the objection, see Parfit, Derek. 2002, “Equality or 
Priority?” In The Ideal of Equality, eds. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams, 81-
125, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
3 For an egalitarian reply to the objection, see Temkin, Larry, “Equality, Priority, and 
the Levelling Down Objection.” In Clayton and Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality.  
4 Huemer, Michael, 2003. Non-Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies, 114: 147-171. 
5 For the contrary view, in favour of intrapersonal egalitarianism, see Mendola, Joseph. 
2004. Justice Within a Life. American Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 125-140. 
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Strong supervenience of utility-value: events have the same utility-value if they are 
intrinsically identical in terms of their non-evaluative properties. 
Cross-temporal additivity of utility-value: given two events, A and B, occupying non-
overlapping time intervals, the utility-value of the fusion of A and B equals the utility-value 
of A plus the utility-value of B. 
  
Huemer’s argument for why these three assumptions commit us to rejecting egalitarianism is 
based on a comparison of three possible worlds (see figure 1). Each world contains only two 
people, A and B. In world 1, A and B each have 75 units of utility in each half of their lives. 
In world 2, A has 100 units in the first half of his life, and 50 in the second half, while B has 
50 units in the first half of his life, and 100 in the second. In world 3, A has 100 in both 
halves of his life, while B has 50 in both halves of his life. 
 
Figure 1. The bars indicate the level of utility that A and B enjoy.  
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To see how the argument works, we first need to note a difference between what Huemer 
calls the total utility of an event, namely, "the sum of the utilities of all the individuals 
involved in the event", and the utility-value of an event, which is its total utility plus any 
additional value the event may have in virtue of the way in which total utility is 
distributed across individuals. To illustrate: utilitarians, who assign no value to 
distributions of utility, believe the utility-value of an event is always the same as the total 
utility of an event. By contrast, Egalitarians, who assign intrinsic value to equal 
distributions of utility, believe the utility-value of an event can be greater than its total 
utility if the distribution of utility in that event is equal. 
 
Back to the argument. If we believe the three assumptions mentioned earlier we would 
are committed, so Huemer maintains, to the conclusion that worlds 1 and 3 have the same 
utility-value. Contrary to what egalitarians believe, the equality that exists in world 1 thus 
makes no difference to its utility-value. His argument for why the three assumptions 
commit us to this conclusion is presented in the following schema (V1 refers to the total 
utility-value of world 1. V1a and V1b refer to the total utility-values of the first and 
second halves of world 1, respectively.): 
 
 
50 
 
 
50 
 
   
  100 
 
 
  100 
 
      
 
    
   100   
 
50 
    
100 
 
50 
 
 
75 
 
 
75 
 
75 
 
 
75 
 
Equality and Value-holism  
 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 5 (1), 2007,  1 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
4
1. V1=V2   From intrapersonal non-egalitarianism 
2. V2a=V3a  From strong supervenience of utility-value 
3. V3a=V3b  From strong supervenience 
4. V2a=V2b  From strong supervenience6 
5. V2b=V3b  From 2,3,4 
6. V2a+V2b=V3a+V3b From 2,5 
7. V2=V2a+V2b  From cross-temporal additivity 
8. V3=V3a+V3b  From cross-temporal additivity 
9. V2=V3   From 6,7,8 
10. V1=V3   From 1,9 
 
Essentially, the argument boils down to three claims. First, worlds 1 and 2 are of equal 
value because the only difference between them is that utility is distributed unequally 
within lives in world 2, and, by the assumption of intrapersonal non-egalitarianism, that 
difference does not give rise to any difference in value. Secondly, all the halves of worlds 
2 and 3 are of equal value, by the assumption of strong supervenience of utility-value. 
Thirdly, worlds 2 and 3 are of equal value, since, if all their halves are of equal value, 
then, by the assumption of cross-temporal additivity, the worlds that result from the 
fusion of those halves are also of equal value. If worlds 1 and 2 are of equal value, and if 
worlds 2 and 3 are of equal value, then worlds 1 and 3 are of equal value. Since 
egalitarianism says world 1 is of greater value than world 3, we must reject therefore 
egalitarianism. 
 
2. 
 
Huemer’s argument is plainly valid. The trouble lies in its assumptions. In this section, I 
show that one of Huemer’s assumptions, namely, cross-temporal additivity, amounts to 
atomism about value, and furthermore, that atomism about value is intuitively 
implausible. I take this appeal to intuition to show only the following: a burden of 
justification must rest on Huemer if he wishes to employ that assumption in order to 
reject egalitarianism. The remainder of the paper shows that Huemer does not meet this 
burden. 
 
Very roughly, atomists about value believe that the value of an entity is equal to the sum 
of the values of its parts. Holists reject the claim that the value of an entity is equal to the 
                                            
6 Strictly speaking, this premise may only follow if one also assumes a principle of 
anonymity, according to which the values of given distributions between persons (such as, 
V2a and V2b) are not affected by the identities of those persons. 
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sum of the values of its parts. Both atomism and holism about value might seem natural 
when we consider different kinds of entities. The value of a bundle of coins, for example, 
seems well captured by the atomists’ valuation procedure. The value of a painting or a 
song, on the other hand, seems better captured holistically: it would seem bizarre to 
maintain that the value of a painting is equivalent to the sum of the values of its parts. 
 
Leaving aside Huemer’s first assumption of intrapersonal non-egalitarianism (which 
egalitarians need have no objection to), his assumption of cross-temporal additivity 
amounts to atomism about the value of trans-temporal entities. That is, it amounts to the 
view that the value of a trans-temporal entity is always identical to the sum of the values 
of its constituent temporal parts. 
 
Atomism about the value of trans-temporal entities is, however, intuitively implausible. 
Consider the following thought-experiment. Suppose the first half of the actual world has 
been like the first half of Huemer’s world 2 (which is the same as the first half of world 
3), and suppose we must now decide whether the second half of the actual world will be 
like the second half of world 2 or whether it will be like the second half of world 3. 
Consider now the following two points. First, all other things being equal, it seems most 
plausible to hold that the second half of the actual world should be like the second half of 
world 2. In other words, we intuitively believe that the two halves of world 2, put 
together, have a greater value than the two halves of world 3, put together.7 Secondly, all 
four halves of worlds 2 and 3, when taken in isolation, have the same value, both in terms 
of the total utility they contain and in terms of the value they contain by virtue of the 
distribution of that utility (the latter point assumes the principle of anonymity). If 
atomism about the value of trans-temporal entities were true, therefore, the two halves of 
world 2, put together, would be of equal value to the two halves of world 3, put together. 
Since, intuitively, they are not of equal value, intuitively, atomism about the value of 
trans-temporal entities is counter-intuitive. 
 
3. 
 
It is important to note that the appeal to intuition just made shows only that a burden of 
justification falls on those, like Huemer, who wish to employ the assumption of cross-
temporal additivity in an argument against egalitarianism. Now Huemer does attempt to 
defend cross-temporal additivity (henceforth, CTA). He does so on the ground that its 
rejection cannot be reconciled with a plausible form of consequentialism. If Huemer is 
right about this, egalitarians who seek to avoid his challenge by embracing holism may 
be unable to reconcile their view with a plausible form of consequentialism. Let us 
                                            
7 That we believe this does not necessarily show that we believe that equality is 
intrinsically valuable; it might instead show that we believe that the worst off should be as 
well off as possible (the priority view). However, this is no objection to the current 
example since it is not meant to show that equality is intrinsically valuable, but only that 
cross-temporal additivity is intuitively implausible.  
Equality and Value-holism  
 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 5 (1), 2007,  1 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
6
briefly consider Huemer’s argument for why egalitarians who deny CTA cannot embrace 
a plausible form of consequentialism.  
 
Huemer asks us to consider a form of consequentialism that includes the following three 
decision-making rules: 
 
1. Choose the action which is such that, if you choose it, the world will be best 
2. Choose the action which has the best overall consequences 
3. Choose the action which is such that, if you choose it, the future will be best 
 
 
Huemer holds that all three rules are reasonable. However, he maintains that rejecting 
CTA disables us from following all three rules, and that we should therefore not reject 
CTA.  
 
To show this, Huemer begins by assuming, for the sake of argument, that world 3 is 
inferior to world 2 on egalitarian grounds, and further, that a negligible improvement in 
world 3 will still leave it inferior to world 2. This means that a new world, world 4, 
which improves on world 3 only negligibly in that B receives 10 extra units of utility in 
the second half of his life, will also be inferior to world 2 (see figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. We assume that world 4 has less utility-value than world 2 because its slightly 
greater amount of utility does not make up for its inequality. 
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Huemer now asks us to consider how a holist would answer the following pair of choice 
problems:8 
 
Problem 1: The first half of the real world’s history has been like the first half of world 
2. At t1, we are offered a choice between bringing about either the second half of world 
                                            
8 Huemer actually presents two pairs of choice problems. For brevity’s sake, I discuss 
only the first pair. The objection I will be raising to his analysis of this pair has equal 
force against his analysis of the other pair.  
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2 or the second half of world 4. Huemer maintains that the holist should choose the 
second half of world 4 on the basis of the following reasoning: (a) V2b=V2a=V4a (by 
virtue of strong supervenience); (b) V4b>V4a; therefore, (c) V4b>V2b.  
 
Problem 2: We must choose between bringing about world 2 and bringing about world 
4. Clearly, the egalitarian holist is committed to choosing world 2. (Recall, we are 
assuming that world 4 has less utility-value than world 2.)  
 
The lesson Huemer draws from the pair of choice problems is this: if CTA is false, as 
the egalitarian maintains, then the three above decision-making rules, all of which are 
reasonable, conflict with each other. As Huemer points out, problems 1 and 2 are 
essentially the same problem: “A choice between the second half of world 2 and the 
second half of world 4, given that the first half of each occurs, is equivalent to a choice 
between worlds 2 and 4.”9 And yet, if CTA is false, then the answers to that same 
problem generated by the three rules do not cohere. If CTA is false, the “best world” 
rule commits us to choosing V2b, whereas the “best consequences” and “best future” 
rules commit us to choosing V4b. 
 
4. 
 
Huemer’s analysis is mistaken, however, and holists need not worry that their position 
clashes with a basic form of consequentialism. It is not correct that the falseness of 
CTA leads the three decision-making rules into conflict with each other. If CTA is 
false, then the “best consequences” and “best future” do not require that we choose 
V4b, as Huemer maintains, but rather that we choose V2b, which is consistent with 
what the “best world” rule requires. This is because the choice between V2b and V4b is 
a choice not just between two halves of worlds but also between two worlds as wholes. 
Our choosing V2b has, as its consequence, world 2 as a whole; our choosing V4b has, 
as its consequence, world 4 as a whole. Insofar as world 2 is, because of its equality, 
more valuable than world 4, egalitarians can thus maintain that V2b is both a better 
consequence and better future than V4b. For egalitarians who reject CTA, all three 
decision-making rules thus issue in the same answer. 
 
Huemer anticipates and replies to a version of this objection, but his reply fails. 
Huemer denies what I am proposing as an answer to problem 1, namely, that world 2 is 
a consequence of our choosing V2b. His argument is as follows: 
 
Intuitively, the consequences of an action cannot lie (even partly) in the 
past. In particular, if A is some event that has already occurred, and my action 
causes B, then we should not call the combined event (A + B) an additional 
‘consequence’ of my action, over and above B. For example, I can bring about 
that I eat a cookie on November 7, 2002. If I do, I will not thereby bring it 
                                            
9 Huemer, “Non-Egalitarianism”, p. 158. 
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about that (Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, and I ate a cookie on 
November 7, 2002); that fact will not be a further consequence of my action, 
over and above the cookie-eating, that I need to take into account in making 
my decision.10 
 
Huemer’s strategy, then, is to show that the holist must rely on a false claim when 
insisting, as I do, that world 2 is a consequence of choosing V2b. This is the claim that 
a combined event (A + B) is a further consequence worth taking into account of an 
action that brings about event B after event A has occurred. 
 
In reply, I suggest that whether a combined event (A + B) is a further consequence 
worth taking into account of an action that brings about event B after event A has 
occurred depends on the nature of the combined event in question. Suppose that the 
combined event is one in which there is no valuable relation between its constituent 
events. In that case, it would indeed be false that this combined event is a further 
consequence worth taking into account. This is the point that Huemer’s Napoleon-
cookie example really shows. It is because there is no valuable relation between 
Napoleon’s losing at Waterloo and my eating a cookie that the combination of these 
two events will not be a consequence worth taking into account when I decide whether 
or not to eat the cookie. But notice that, while Huemer’s Napoleon-cookie example 
might show that one type of combined event is not a further consequence worth taking 
into account, it does not show all types of combined events are not worth taking 
account. In particular, it does not show that those combined events that contain a 
valuable relation between their constituent events are not worth taking into account. 
The holist, then, can claim – and this is all she need claim - that if and only if a 
combined event (A + B) contains a valuable relation between its constituent events, 
then that combined event is a further consequence worth taking into account in our 
consequentialist decision-making of an action that brings about event B after event A 
has occurred. This claim is not threatened by the Napoleon-cookie example. 
 
Let me strengthen the case for the holist’s position with the following example. 
Suppose that my co-performer in an opera has just sung the first half of a lovely song 
and I must decide whether to complete the song. Now, if we assume, as seems 
plausible, that there exists a valuable relation between the two halves of a lovely song, 
then, according to what I have argued, the fact that a whole lovely song will have been 
sung would be a further consequence of my action worth taking into account when 
deciding whether or not I should sing the second half of the song (a further 
consequence, that is, to the fact that the second half of the song would have been song). 
If this is sensible, then, by analogy, it is also sensible for egalitarians to maintain that if 
there is a valuable relation between the two halves of world 2, then world 2 will be a 
consequence worth taking into account of my choosing V2b. Once we scrutinise 
closely Huemer’s objection to the holist’s application of the “best consequences” rule, 
then, that objection appears unwarranted.   
 
                                            
10 Ibid., pp. 160-1. 
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5. 
 
Huemer’s challenge to egalitarians can be presented as a dilemma in which egalitarians 
must either be atomists about value, in which case they cannot show that equality has 
intrinsic value, or they must be holists about value, in which case they cannot reconcile 
their position with a basic form of consequentialism. I have shown that the second horn 
of the dilemma is not as fatal as Huemer assumes. Egalitarians can embrace value-holism 
and avoid inconsistency with consequentialism. Huemer’s challenge to egalitarians 
therefore fails. Nevertheless, it has merit in showing that egalitarians may have to be 
value-holists in order to defend their position.11 
 
                                            
11 I would like to thank Serena Olsaretti, Martin O’Neill, and Andrea Sangiovanni-
Vincentelli for their comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
